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dc.contributor.authorStrand, Jonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18714-
dc.description.abstractI derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured alternatively by household member i?s willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the household, WTPi(H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, WTP(C). Households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient Nash bargains over private and common household goods. WTPi(H) is then found by trading off the public good against household goods, and WTP(C) by trading the public good off against private goods. I then find that WTPi(H) is higher (lower) when member i has a high (low) marginal valuation of the public good, but on average represents WTP(C) correctly. Individuals then tend to represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household?s WTP for a public good, even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully. Counting all members? WTP answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting. Pure and paternalistic altruism (the latter attached to consumption of the public good) move each member?s WTP on behalf of the household closer to the true aggregate WTP, but only the latter raises aggregate WTP.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1351en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelD13en_US
dc.subject.jelQ26en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordwillingness to payen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontingent valuationen_US
dc.subject.keywordintrafamily allocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash bargainingen_US
dc.subject.stwWillingness to payen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwFamilieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePublic-good valuation and intrafamily allocationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477504620en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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