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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18713
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| Title: | | Piracy and competition  |
| Authors: | | Belleflamme, Paul Picard, Pierre M. |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1350 |
| Abstract: | | The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizontally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and reduces total surplus. |
| Subjects: | | information goods piracy copyright pricing |
| JEL: | | L13 L86 L82 K11 O34 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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