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dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:20Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18709-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of individuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative investments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productive investments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerning the optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in the former case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the opposite holds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case of anarchic societies and competition on markets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1346en_US
dc.subject.jelL10en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsize effectsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordanarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen_US
dc.titleContests with size effectsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477414249en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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