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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Berger, Helge | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Mueller, Till | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:52:19Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:52:19Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1344 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Central Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Federal Central Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Currency Union | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | optimal representation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | voting | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | ECB | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zentralbank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Abstimmungsregel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Landesgrösse | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Geldpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | EU-Staaten | | en_US |
| dc.title | | How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union? | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 477413463 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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