EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBerger, Helgeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMueller, Tillen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:19Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707-
dc.description.abstractThe likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1344en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCentral Banken_US
dc.subject.keywordFederal Central Banken_US
dc.subject.keywordCurrency Unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal representationen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordECBen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwLandesgrösseen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleHow should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477413463en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
cesifo1_wp1344.pdf474.98 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.