Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690
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dc.contributor.authorLi, Jianpeien_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:12Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690-
dc.description.abstractWe study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnershipsform in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities mayarise that make partners? skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatiblepartnership contract that can be implemented by a simple call option, and then analyze thecommonly used buy?sell provision. We show that this dissolution rule gives rise toinefficiency, either in the form of excessive dissolutions combined with underinvestment orefficient dissolutions combined with overinvestment. However, supplementing the buy?sellprovision with the right to veto may restore efficiency.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working papers |x1325en_US
dc.subject.jelL24en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwPartnerschaftsgesellschaften_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwRealoptionen_US
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePartnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477404790en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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