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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Li, Jianpei | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wolfstetter, Elmar | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnershipsform in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities mayarise that make partners? skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatiblepartnership contract that can be implemented by a simple call option, and then analyze thecommonly used buy'sell provision. We show that this dissolution rule gives rise toinefficiency, either in the form of excessive dissolutions combined with underinvestment orefficient dissolutions combined with overinvestment. However, supplementing the buy'sellprovision with the right to veto may restore efficiency. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1325 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L24 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Partnerschaftsgesellschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Realoption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Qualifikation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477404790 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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