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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18687
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Bisin, Alberto | en |
dc.contributor.author | Gottardi, Piero | en |
dc.contributor.author | Rampini, Adriano A. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18687 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cashflow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence givesthem an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agencyproblem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his incentivecompensation using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor themanager's portfolio in order to keep him from hedging the risk in his compensation. Inparticular, shareholders can monitor the manager's portfolio stochastically, and sincemonitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholderscan seize the payoffs of the manager's trades. We show that at the optimal contract: (i) themanager's portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the more costlymonitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager's compensation to firm performance, and (iii)conditional on the firm's performance, the manager's compensation is lower when hisportfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1322 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | executive compensation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monitoring | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance | en |
dc.subject.stw | Führungskräfte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsorientierte Vergütung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Aktienoptionsplan | en |
dc.subject.stw | Hedging | en |
dc.subject.stw | Portfolio-Management | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungskontrolle | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477399665 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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