Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18681 
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dc.contributor.authorCrifo, Patriciaen
dc.contributor.authorRullière, Jean-Louisen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:08Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18681-
dc.description.abstractIn our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it amongheterogeneous users. The agent's payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and thecoefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity thegame leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non-egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users bydelivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer(but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle.Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1316en
dc.subject.jelL32en
dc.subject.jelJ45en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelC9en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordanonymity principleen
dc.subject.keywordegalitarian tasks allocationen
dc.subject.keywordprincipal agent user relationshipen
dc.subject.keywordcrowding-out effecten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Dienstleistungen
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen
dc.subject.stwVerbraucheren
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwPencil-Pusher Gameen
dc.titleIncentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward users-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477390900en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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