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dc.contributor.authorCrifo, Patriciaen_US
dc.contributor.authorRullière, Jean-Louisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:08Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18681-
dc.description.abstractIn our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agent?s payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity the game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non- egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer (but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle. Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1316en_US
dc.subject.jelL32en_US
dc.subject.jelJ45en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelC9en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordanonymity principleen_US
dc.subject.keywordegalitarian tasks allocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal agent user relationshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordcrowding-out effecten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Dienstleistungen_US
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen_US
dc.subject.stwVerbraucheren_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPencil-Pusher Gameen_US
dc.titleIncentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward usersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477390900en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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