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Title:Incentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward users PDF Logo
Authors:Crifo, Patricia
Rullière, Jean-Louis
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1316
Abstract:In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agent?s payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity the game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non- egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer (but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle. Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.
Subjects:incentives
anonymity principle
egalitarian tasks allocation
principal agent user relationship
crowding-out effect
JEL:L32
J45
J33
C9
M5
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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