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dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.description.abstractThe present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1315en_US
dc.subject.keywordSimultaneous Ascending Auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordweak dominanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwVollkommene Informationen_US
dc.titleImmediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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