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Title:Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions PDF Logo
Authors:Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1315
Abstract:The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.
Subjects:Simultaneous Ascending Auction
weak dominance
multi-unit auctions
game theory
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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