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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680
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| Title: | | Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions  |
| Authors: | | Riedel, Frank Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1315 |
| Abstract: | | The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding. |
| Subjects: | | Simultaneous Ascending Auction weak dominance multi-unit auctions game theory |
| JEL: | | D45 D44 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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