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dc.contributor.authorDeardorff, Alan V.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:01Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18666-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I argue that profit-maximizing firms, even though they contribute to social welfare when they compete in the market, may not do so when they influence the political process. In particular, I suggest, through several examples from both the real world and from economic theory, that corporations have played a significant role in the formulation of the rules of the international trading system. They did this in the formation of the WTO, where they were responsible for the expansion to cover both intellectual property and services. And they do this in preferential trading arrangements such as the NAFTA, where they inserted the notorious Chapter 11 and specified rules of origin for automotive products. All of this is quite consistent with economic theory, including the literature on the political economy of trade policy. I also use a simple duopoly model to illustrate a domestic firm?s interest in setting rules of origin. The corporate influence on rules need not be bad, but there is no reason why it should be good either, as these examples illustrate.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1301en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economy of tradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade institutionsen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsorganisationen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwWorld Trade Organizationen_US
dc.subject.stwNorth American Free Trade Agreementen_US
dc.titleWho makes the rules of globalization?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477259731en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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