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dc.contributor.authorNetzer, Nicken
dc.contributor.authorScheuer, Florianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:47:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:47:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18507-
dc.description.abstractWe examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can occur even in the standard case in which individuals exogenously differ in risk only. We then extend the model to allow for both privately known risks and labor productivities. This endogenously introduces two-dimensional heterogeneity in the insurance market since precautionary labor effects lead to differences in income and hence risk aversion. Under these circumstances, separating and pooling equilibria exist, which generally differ from those with exogenous two-dimensional heterogeneity considered by the existing literature. Notably, in contrast to standard screening models, profits may be increasing with insurance coverage, and the correlation between risk and coverage can be zero or negative in equilibrium, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x614en
dc.subject.jelJ22en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInsurance Marketsen
dc.subject.keywordAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.keywordPrecautionary Laboren
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsmarkten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompetitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn518571548en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp614en

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