EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18365
  
Title:Transitional Dynamics in a Growth Model with Distributive Politics PDF Logo
Authors:Ghate, Chetan
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:DIW-Diskussionspapiere 514
Abstract:This paper constructs a heterogenous agent model of endogenous distribution and growth. When the labor leisure choice of agents is exogenous, the factor holding ratios of households converges to a mass point that is independent of the initial distribution of capital in the steady state. There is complete equality and every household?s preferred tax rate equals the growth maximizing tax rate. There is no distributive conflict in the long run. When the labor leisure choice of households is endogenous, there is also complete convergence in the factor holding ratios of agents in the steady state. However, the tax rate under majority voting is less than the growth maximizing tax rate which leads to distributive conflict in the long run. These results extend the model of endogenous distribution and growth in Das and Ghate (2004) in two ways. First, we assess the impact of redistributive politics on growth by looking at the effect of income inequality on the tax rate and labor supply. Second, the model is solved using a more empirically plausible specification of the government budget constraint in which households vote over the tax rate on capital income instead of a tax on wealth. The general insight gained from the analysis is that characterizing the transitional dynamics in a model of redistributive politics and growth is not an intractable proposition.
Subjects:Distributive Conflict
Endogenous Distribution
Median Voter Theorem
Endogenous Growth
JEL:P16
O40
E62
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW
DIW-Diskussionspapiere

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
dp514.pdf321.37 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18365

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.