Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18354 
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18354-
dc.description.abstracthis paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under diŽerent assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x503en
dc.subject.jelO15en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensverteilungen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsmodellen
dc.titleVoting, Inequality, and Redistribution-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn494463228en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp503en

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