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Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Baake, Pio | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Mitusch, Kay | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:41:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:41:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 500 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L96 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | telecommunication | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | mobile phones | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | mobile-to-mobile access charges | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | network effects | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 494462701 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW DIW-Diskussionspapiere
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