|
EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
|
| | |
| Title: | | Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation  |
| Authors: | | Baake, Pio Mitusch, Kay |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 500 |
| Abstract: | | We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare. |
| Subjects: | | telecommunication mobile phones mobile-to-mobile access charges network effects |
| JEL: | | L41 L96 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW DIW-Diskussionspapiere
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|