Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
Authors: 
Baake, Pio
Mitusch, Kay
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 500
Abstract: 
We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.
Subjects: 
telecommunication
mobile phones
mobile-to-mobile access charges
network effects
JEL: 
L41
L96
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
334.06 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.