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Title:Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation PDF Logo
Authors:Baake, Pio
Mitusch, Kay
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:DIW-Diskussionspapiere 500
Abstract:We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.
Subjects:telecommunication
mobile phones
mobile-to-mobile access charges
network effects
JEL:L41
L96
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DIW-Diskussionspapiere
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW

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