EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281
  
Title:Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion PDF Logo
Authors:Borck, Rainald
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:DIW-Diskussionspapiere 297
Abstract:This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat.
Subjects:Tax evasion
enforcement
voting
JEL:H26
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW
DIW-Diskussionspapiere

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
dp297.pdf172.67 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.