Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281
Authors: 
Borck, Rainald
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 297
Abstract: 
This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat.
Subjects: 
Tax evasion
enforcement
voting
JEL: 
H26
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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