Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:40:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:40:33Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW-Diskussionspapiere |x297en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerliche Betriebsprüfungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerstraftaten_US
dc.subject.stwSozialtransferen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStricter enforcement may increase tax evasionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn848984102en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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