EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW Diskussionspapiere >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition PDF Logo
Authors:Zhang, Zhentang
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:DIW-Diskussionspapiere 295
Abstract:This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost-reducing R&D, and have higher output, lower prices and lower profits, as compared to profit-maximizers in an owner-run game. Secondly, we find that R&D collusion induces owners in a delegation game to choose more aggressive managerial incentives as compared to R&D competition, which in turn leads to increased R&D investment, reduced product prices and increased profits.
Subjects:Strategic Delegation
Managerial Incentives
R&D competition and R&D collusion
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DIW Diskussionspapiere
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW Berlin

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
dp295.pdf367.99 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.