Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18244 
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dc.contributor.authorBaake, Pioen
dc.contributor.authorKamecke, Ulrichen
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:40:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:40:19Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18244-
dc.description.abstractIn a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In contrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the non-integrated downstream firm receives a strictly positive amount of the intermediate good, the downstream allocation is inefficient. However, a parametrized example indicates that competition at the downstream level may increase aggregate welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x260en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelL10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordVertical restraintsen
dc.subject.keywordcommitmenten
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwMonopolen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn848823818en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp260en

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