|
EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18160
|
| | |
| Title: | | The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly  |
| Authors: | | Inderst, Roman Wey, Christian |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 423 |
| Abstract: | | We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders´ share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements. |
| Subjects: | | Takeover bidding Merger incentives Oligopoly |
| JEL: | | L13 D43 L41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW DIW-Diskussionspapiere
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18160
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|