Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18126 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:33Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18126-
dc.description.abstractThe paper presents a model where public pensions are determined by majority voting. Voters differ by age and income. Moreover, life expectancy increases with income. Depending on the strength of the link between contributions and benefits, and the relationship between income and life expectancy, individually optimal tax rates may increase or decrease with income. If they decrease, high tax rates are supported by pensioners and poor workers. If they increase with income, the coalition for high tax rates consists of pensioners and rich workers. 'Ends against the middle' equilibria are also possible.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x369en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keywordpublic pensionsen
dc.subject.keywordlife expectancyen
dc.subject.stwGesetzliche Rentenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwEinkommenen
dc.subject.stwSterblichkeiten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the choice of public pensions when income and life expectancy are correlated-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn850975913en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp369en

Files in This Item:
File
Size
241.17 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.