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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073
  

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dc.contributor.authorHaller, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorSarangi, Sudiptaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:11Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073-
dc.description.abstractA non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDIW-Diskussionspapiere 337en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverbreitungen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleNash Networks with Heterogeneous Agentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn370777174en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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DIW-Diskussionspapiere

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