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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:10Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071-
dc.description.abstractThis note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDIW-Diskussionspapiere 335en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSteuersystemen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn369048423en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW
DIW-Diskussionspapiere

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