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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071
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| Title: | | Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model  |
| Authors: | | Borck, Rainald |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 335 |
| Abstract: | | This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average. |
| Subjects: | | tax competition voting |
| JEL: | | D72 H77 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW DIW-Diskussionspapiere
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