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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:08Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18065-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDIW-Diskussionspapiere 329en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVoting on Redistribution with Tax Evasionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn368872882en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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