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Title:Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion PDF Logo
Authors:Borck, Rainald
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:DIW-Diskussionspapiere 329
Abstract:This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.
Subjects:Tax evasion
redistribution
voting
JEL:D72
H26
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DIW-Diskussionspapiere
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW

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