Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18056 
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dc.contributor.authorZak, Paul J.en
dc.contributor.authorGhate, Chetanen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:05Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18056-
dc.description.abstractIs it politically feasible for governments to engineer endogenous growth? This paper illustrates two reasonable political decision mechanisms by which fiscal policy generates endogenous growth with a single accumulable factor, under a constant returns to scale production technology, and without production externalities. In the first mechanism, optimal policies are chosen by the government to maximize constituent support by raising aggregate income. In the second mechanism, optimal policies are determined in a voting equilibrium where agents are concerned only with their own incomes. We demonstrate that policies that target aggregates generate balanced growth and are Pareto optimal. Policies chosen by the median voter also produce balanced growth, but result in public investment 50% below the socially optimal level.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x320en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.jelO40en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic Investmenten
dc.subject.keywordPositive Political Economyen
dc.subject.keywordMedian Voter Theoremen
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Growthen
dc.subject.stwNeue Wachstumstheorieen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Investitionen
dc.subject.stwWachstumspolitiken
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe politics of endogenous growth-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn849540569en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp320en

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