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dc.contributor.authorChami, Ralphen_US
dc.contributor.authorSharma, Sunilen_US
dc.contributor.authorShim, Ilhyocken_US
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF´s objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan´s dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear´s dilemma.en_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers / Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2007-26en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoinsurance arrangementen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordSamaritan´s dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.keywordKing Lear´s dilemmaen_US
dc.titleA Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangementen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers

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