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Title:A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement PDF Logo
Authors:Chami, Ralph
Sharma, Sunil
Shim, Ilhyock
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Economics Discussion Papers / Institut für Weltwirtschaft 2007-26
Abstract:The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF´s objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan´s dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear´s dilemma.
Subjects:IMF
coinsurance arrangement
moral hazard
Samaritan´s dilemma
King Lear´s dilemma
JEL:G22
F02
D82
F33
Creative Commons License:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers

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