Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/17928 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2007-5
Publisher: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Abstract: 
We construct a Blanchard-style overlapping generations model consisting of long-lived individuals who have uninsurable idiosyncratic risk resulting from uncertain retirement periods and medical costs in retirement. Without social insurance, such individuals must save for these eventualities. We examine the impact of pay-as-you-go social insurance policies (public pensions and medicare coverage) on individual and aggregate consumption, saving, and wealth levels as well as wealth distribution. We also derive expressions for optimal (Pareto improving) social insurance policies.
JEL: 
D91
J20
E10
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
326.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.