|
EconStor >
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17833
|
| | |
| Title: | | Complementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentives  |
| Authors: | | Heinrich, Ralph P. |
| Issue Date: | | 2000 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Kieler Arbeitspapiere 968 |
| Abstract: | | The paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm?s risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated ownership has on monitoring via reduced free rider problems. Moreover, the paper shows how the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership, which is the loss of risk-sharing benefits, creates scope to use leverage as an additional complementary governance instrument. The paper offers new explanations for several empirical regularities found in the literature. |
| Subjects: | | Corporate governance Complementarity Agency problem |
| JEL: | | G30 D23 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
| File |
Description |
Size | Format |
| kap968.pdf | | 94.58 kB | Adobe PDF |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17833
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|