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dc.contributor.authorHeinrich, Ralph P.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:59:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:59:47Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/17833-
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm's risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated ownership has on monitoring via reduced free rider problems. Moreover, the paper shows how the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership, which is the loss of risk-sharing benefits, creates scope to use leverage as an additional complementary governance instrument. The paper offers new explanations for several empirical regularities found in the literature.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x968en
dc.subject.jelG30en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordComplementarityen
dc.subject.keywordAgency problemen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwOpportunitätskostenen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwKontrolleen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwKapitalstrukturen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.subject.stwJapanen
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen
dc.titleComplementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn859832023en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:968en
dc.identifier.printppn311588549en

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