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dc.contributor.authorHeinrich, Ralph P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:59:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:59:47Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/17833-
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm?s risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated ownership has on monitoring via reduced free rider problems. Moreover, the paper shows how the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership, which is the loss of risk-sharing benefits, creates scope to use leverage as an additional complementary governance instrument. The paper offers new explanations for several empirical regularities found in the literature.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKieler Arbeitspapiere 968en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordComplementarityen_US
dc.subject.keywordAgency problemen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwOpportunitätskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwKontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.subject.stwJapanen_US
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen_US
dc.titleComplementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn311588549en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW

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