Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17781
Authors: 
Schertler, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1117
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist?s incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.
Subjects: 
Double-sided moral hazard
public equity
venture capital
JEL: 
L14
G28
G24
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
264.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.