Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/130791 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 777
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical predictions that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will not. The experiment shows, first, that welfare gains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions, and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies.
Schlagwörter: 
Multicandidate elections
Information aggregation
Plurality
Approval Voting
Laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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