Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/130495 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 16-004/V
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
This paper presents an alternative implementation of firm-level collective wage bargaining, where bargaining proceeds as a finite sequence of sessions between a firm and a union of variable size. We investigate the impact of such a `gradual' union on the wage-employment contract in an economy with concave production. In a static framework, the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the efficient bargaining outcome. In a dynamic framework with search frictions, we demonstrate that gradual collective wage bargaining coincides with all-or-nothing bargaining when bargaining takes place in fictitious time before production.
Subjects: 
collective bargaining
gradual union
firm
search frictions
employment-at-will
JEL: 
J30
J41
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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