Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/130475 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5850
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
By introducing controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules, the parent country of a multinational firm reserves the right to tax the income of the firm’s foreign affiliates if the tax rate in the affiliate’s host country is below a specified threshold. We identify the conditions under which binding CFC rules are part of the optimal tax mix when governments can set the statutory tax rate, a thin capitalization rule and the CFC rule. We also analyze the effects of economic and financial integration on the optimal policy mix. Our results correspond to the actual development of anti-avoidance rules in OECD countries.
Subjects: 
multinationals
profit shifting
controlled foreign company rules
thin capitalization rules
JEL: 
H25
H73
F23
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.