Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129520 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 12-1
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider optimal monetary stabilization policy in a New Keynesian model with explicit microfoundations, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close enough to model-consistency. We show how to characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric family of candidate policy rules. We show that robustly optimal policy can be implemented through commitment to a target criterion involving only the paths of inflation and a suitably defined output gap, but that a concern for robustness requires greater resistance to surprise increases in inflation than would be considered optimal if one could count on the private sector to have "rational expectations".
Schlagwörter: 
robust control
near-rational expectations
belief distortions
target criterion
JEL: 
D81
D84
E52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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