Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119692 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 86.2002
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
I present in this paper an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic and sequential climate change decision making in the international arena taking into account influence processes occuring during negotiation rounds. The analysis integrates imitation, persuasion and dissuasion behaviors. The main innovation brought in the approach is the presentation of a stochastic model framework derived from thermodynamics. The so-called master equation is introduced in order to better understand strategic switch and influence games exerted. The model is illustrated toward a simulation of climate change conferences decision making processes. Characteristics of regions behaviors are derived from the simulations. In particular the bargain behaviors allowing for the emergence of an agreement are presented.
Subjects: 
Imitation
Persuasion
Climate Change Negotiation
Master Equation
JEL: 
D74
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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