Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119425 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2015-012
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the impact of CDS trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risksharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower's debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems.
Schlagwörter: 
Loan Sales
Credit Default Swaps
Syndicate Structure
Syndicated Loans
JEL: 
G21
G32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
967.68 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.