Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/118061 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 22.2003
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A fixed supply may not be optimal even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity different from her target supply.
Schlagwörter: 
Uniform-price auction
divisible good
strategic role of the seller
endogenous supply
Treasury and IPO auctions
JEL: 
D44
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
553.72 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.