Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/117895 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 16.2004
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Internet auctions, such as those on eBay, are known for multiple bidding and sniping. Buyers send bids in the closing seconds of an auction, knowing that bids arriving after the closure of the auction are not counted. They also bid several times at the same auction. We model Internet auction as a dynamic multi-unit auction. This let us explain the rationality of both sniping and multiple bidding. By submitting multiple bids, buyers co-ordinate between auctions, so that all objects are finally sold and no-one has to pay too high a price. When bidders submit multiple bids, they might bid very late in the end.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
Electronic Commerce
Internet
JEL: 
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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