Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111252 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 195
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
The axiomatic route to the foundation of contest success functions (CSF) has proved to be both useful and prolific. The standard approach in the literature is based on the decision-theoretic notion that choice probabilities should be independent of irrelevant alternatives (Skaperdas, Economic Theory 1996). The present paper develops an alternative approach that suggests itself once the contest is re-interpreted as a common-pool resource problem. Proceeding along these lines, new axiomatizations are obtained for a variety of popular classes of CSFs, including the logit, Tullock, and difference-form CSFs. The axiomatizations provided are particularly parsimonious in the important special case of two contestants.
Subjects: 
Contest success functions
Axiomatic approach
Common-pool resource problems
JEL: 
D24
D42
D62
D72
Q2
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.