Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110635 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2015-301
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
Information Release
Information Partitions
Order Statistics
Stochastic Orders
Dispersion
Dispersive Order
Excess Wealth Order
JEL: 
D44
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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