Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108606 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1222
Verlag: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF), Istanbul
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a new theory of suboptimal risk-taking based on contractual externalities. We examine an industry with a continuum of firms. Each firm's manager exerts costly hidden effort. The productivity of effort is subject to systematic shocks. Firms' stock prices reflect their performance relative to the industry average. In this setting, stock-based incentives cause complementarities in managerial effort choices. Externalities arise because shareholders do not internalize the impact of their incentive provision on the average effort. During booms, they over-incentivise managers, triggering a rat-race in effort exertion, resulting in excessive risk relative to the second-best. The opposite occurs during busts.
Schlagwörter: 
Stock-Based Incentives
Excessive Risk-Taking
Insufficient Risk-Taking
Contractual Externalities
JEL: 
D86
G01
G30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
591.02 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.