Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/106869 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
20th Biennial Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies" , Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 30th-03rd December, 2014
Verlag: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Zusammenfassung: 
Bundling under monopoly tends to increase demand and market efficiency, but likely at the expense of transferring consumers' surplus to firms. Public utilities can use this increase in demand to reduce the monthly fee per consumer. To demonstrate it, I conduct a numerical analysis of the effects of bundling under breakeven price regulation for the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. I estimate the willingness-to-pay for broadcasting services and simulate consumer choices under pure bundling and a-la-carte pricing with breakeven price regulation. Comparing pure bundling and a-la-carte pricing of terrestrial television and satellite television, the increase in demand caused by bundling is very slight due to the strong positive correlation of WTPs. However, compared with a-la-carte pricing, consumer welfare increases by 1.7% with bundling of channels and by 28.2% with bundling of genres.
Schlagwörter: 
Bundling
Public utilities
Policy analysis
JEL: 
L82
L30
D49
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
325.7 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.