Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105144 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5089
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the information available about rules. Each player can only observe which class, out of a collection of classes smaller than the number of rules, the opponent's rule belongs to. For any underlying 2-player, finite, normal-form game there is a game extended with coarsely observable strategies that has equilibria with payoffs arbitrarily close to any feasible, individually rational payoff profile.
Schlagwörter: 
cooperation
reciprocity
transparency
commitment
contract
JEL: 
C72
C78
D74
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
170.93 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.