Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105009 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere No. V-321-10
Publisher: 
University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Oldenburg
Abstract: 
Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why in- dividuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If true, signaling implies the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due to a lack of data this issue has not been tested previously. Based on a novel data set comprising detailed demographic and wage information for some 7,000 German IT employees, this paper fills this gap. In the empirical analysis, however, we find no support for the signaling hypothesis, a result that is robust to different measures of OSS involvement and different model specifications.
Subjects: 
open source software
signaling
wage differentials
JEL: 
J31
J24
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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