Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104573 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2014-018
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer´s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.
Schlagwörter: 
experiments
incomplete information
social preferences
ultimatum
JEL: 
C72
C91
D63
D74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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